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Contexts are maximal collections of co-measurable observables. Different notions of contexts are discussed for
classical, quantum and generalized urn–automaton systems. In doing so, the logical relations and operations
among quantum propositions and their probabilities are reviewed and compared to some other nonclassical cases,
in particular to generalized urn models and finite automata.
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2I. MOTIVATION
In what follows we shall investigate and formalize the informal notion of context as a collection of all co-measurable observ-
ables. In classical physics, the context coincides with the whole extent of observables. That two or more observables may not be
co-measurable; i.e., operationally obtainable simultaneously, did not bother the classical mind until around 1920. This situation
changed dramatically with the emergence of quantum mechanics, and in particular with the discovery of complementarity and
value indefiniteness.
We shall make use of algebraic formalizations, in particular logic. Quantum logic is about the relations and operations among
statements referring to the quantum world. As quantum physics is an extension of classical physics, so is quantum logic an
extension of classical logic. Classical physics can be extended in many mindboggling, weird ways. The question as to why
Nature “prefers” the quantum mindboggling way over others appears most fascinating to the open mind. Before understanding
some of the issues, one has to master classical as well as quantum logic and some of its doubles.
Logic will be expressed as algebra. That is an approach which can be formalized. Other approaches, such as the widely held
opportunistic belief that something is true because it is useful might also be applicable (for instance in acrimonious divorces),
though less formalized. Some of the material presented here has already been published elsewhere, in particular the partition
logic part (1), or the section on quantum probabilities (2). Here we emphasize the importance of the notion of context, which
may serve as a unifying principle for all of the logics discussed.
II. CLASSICAL CONTEXTS
Logic is an ancient philosophical discipline. Its algebraization started in the mid-nineteenth century with Boole’s Laws of
Thought (3). In what follows, Boole’s approach, in particular to probability theory, is reviewed.
A. Boolean algebra
A Boolean algebra B is a set endowed with two binary operations ∧ (called “and”) and ∨ (called “or”), as well as a unary
operation “ ’ ” (called “negation”). It also contains two elements 1 (called “true”) and 0 (called “false”). These entities satisfy
associativity, commutativity, the absorption law and distributivity. Every element has a unique complement.
A typical example of a Boolean algebra is in set theory. The operations are identified with the set theoretic intersection, union,
and complement, respectively. The implication relation is identified with the subset relation..
B. Classical probabilities
Classical probabilities (including the joint probabilities) can be represented as points of a convex polytope spanned by all
“extreme cases;” more formally: by all two-valued measures on the Boolean algebra. Two-valued measures, also called disper-
sionless measures or valuations, acquire only the values “0” and “1,” interpretable as falsity and truth, respectively.
The associated polytope, also termed correlation polytope (4; 5; 6; 7; 8) (see also Refs. (9; 10; 11)) thus establishes bounds
on the probabilities, termed “conditions of possible experience” by Boole (3; 12). The polytope faces impose “inside–outside”
distinctions. The associated inequalities must be obeyed by all classical probability distributions; they are strict bounds on
classical probabilities. In what follows we shall study cases for even number of events, their probabilities and the “conditions of
possible experience.”
1. Two-event “1–1” case
Let us demonstrate the bounds on classical probabilities by the simplest nontrivial example of two propositions; e.g.,
E ≡“a particle detector aligned along direction a clicks,” and
F ≡“a particle detector aligned along direction b clicks.”
Consider also the joint proposition
E ∧F ≡ “the two particle detectors aligned along directions a and b click.”
The notation “1–1” alludes to the experimental setup, in which the two events are registered by detectors located at two “adjacent
sites.” For multiple direction measurements, see Fig. 1.















FIG. 1 Measurements of E1,E2,E3 on the “left,” and F1,F2,F3 on the “right” hand side, along directions θi.
E F E ∧F ≡ E ·F
1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 1 0 0







TABLE I Construction of the correlation polytope for two events: a) the four possible cases are represented by the truth table, whose rows
can be interpreted as three-dimensional vectors forming the vertices of the correlation polytope; b) the resulting four faces of the polytope are
characterized by half-spaces which are obtained by solving the hull problem. .
the rows as vectors in three-dimensional vector space. Four cases, interpretable as truth assignments or two-valued measures,
correspond to the four vectors (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (1,0,0), and (1,1,1). The correlation polytope
(p,q, pq) = κ1(0,0,0)+ κ2(0,1,0)+ κ3(1,0,0)+ κ4(1,1,1) = (κ3 + κ4,κ2 + κ4,κ4)
is spanned by the convex sum κ1 + κ2 + κ3 + κ4 = 1 of these four vectors, which thus are vertices of the polytope. λi can be
interpreted as the normalized weight for event i to occur. The configuration is drawn in Figure 2.
By the Minkoswki-Weyl representation theorem (e.g, Ref. (13, p.29)), every convex polytope has a dual (equivalent) descrip-
tion: either as the convex hull of its extreme points (vertices); or as the intersection of a finite number of half-spaces. Such facets
are given by linear inequalities, which are obtained from the set of vertices by solving the so called hull problem. The inequali-
ties coincide with Boole’s “conditions of possible experience.” The hull problem is algorithmically solvable but computationally
hard (14).
In the above example, the “conditions of possible experience” are given by the inequalities enumerated in Table Ib). One of
their consequences are bounds on joint occurrences of events. Suppose, for example, that the probability of a click in detector
aligned along direction a is 0.9, and the probability of a click in the second detector aligned along direction b is 0.7. Then








































FIG. 2 The correlation polytope for two events. The vertices are (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (1,0,0), and (1,1,1). The four faces of the polytope are
characterized by the inequalities in Table Ib). .
4E1 E2 F1 F2 E1F1 E1F2 E2F1 E2F2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
7 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
8 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
11 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
12 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
15 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE II Construction of the correlation polytope for four events. The 16 possible cases are represented by the truth table, whose rows can
be interpreted as three-dimensional vectors forming the vertices of the correlation polytope; b) the resulting four faces of the polytope are
characterized by half-spaces which are obtained by solving the hull problem. .
If, for instance, somebody comes up with a joint probability of 0.4, we would know that this result is flawed, possibly by
fundamental measurement errors, or by cheating.
2. Four-event “2–2” case
A configuration discussed in quantum mechanics is one with four events grouped into two equal parts E1,E2 and F1,F2. There
are 24 different cases of occurrence or nonoccurrence of these four events enumerated in Table II. By solving the hull problem,
one obtains a set of conditions of possible experience which represent the bounds on classical probabilities enumerated in Table
III. For historical reasons, the bounds 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, and 23-24 are called the Clauser-Horne inequalities (15; 16). They
are structural equivalent (up to permutations of pi,qi), and are the only additional inequalities structurally different from the
two-event “1–1” case.
3. Six event “3–3” case
A similar calculation (8) for six events E1,E2,E3,F1,F2,F3 depicted in Fig. 1 yields an additional independent (17; 18)
inequality for their probabilities p1, p2, p3,q1,q2,q3 of the type
p1q1 + p2q2 + p1q3 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2q3 + p3q1− p3q2 ≤ p1 + 2q1 + q2. (1)
C. Classical contexts as classical logics
In a heuristic sense, a Boolean algebra is the collection of all possible “propositions” or “knowables.” Every knowable can be
combined with every other one by the standard operations “and” and “or.” Operationally, all knowables are in principle knowable
simultaneously. Stated differently: within the Boolean “universe,” the knowables are all consistently co-knowable. In this sense,
classical contexts coincide with the collection of all possible observables, which are expressed by Boolean algebras.
III. QUANTUM CONTEXTS
Omniscience in a omni-deterministic classical sense is no longer possible for quantum systems. There are at least two reasons
for this: first, complementarity and, algebraically associated with it, there is a breakdown of distributivity; second, one encounters
5full facet inequality facet inequality for p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 12
1 p1q1 ≥ 0 p1q1 ≥ 0
2 p1q2 ≥ 0 p1q2 ≥ 0
3 p2q1 ≥ 0 p2q1 ≥ 0
4 p2q2 ≥ 0 p2q2 ≥ 0
5 p1 ≥ p1q1 12 ≥ p1q1
6 p1 ≥ p1q2 12 ≥ p1q2
7 q1 ≥ p1q1 12 ≥ p1q1
8 q1 ≥ p1q2 12 ≥ p1q2
9 p2 ≥ p2q1 12 ≥ p2q1
10 p2 ≥ p2q2 12 ≥ p2q2
11 q2 ≥ p2q1 12 ≥ p2q1
12 q2 ≥ p1q2 12 ≥ p2q2
13 p1q1 ≥ p1 +q1 −1 p1q1 ≥ 0
14 p1q2 ≥ p1 +q2 −1 p1q2 ≥ 0
15 p2q1 ≥ p2 +q1 −1 p2q1 ≥ 0
16 p2q2 ≥ p2 +q2 −1 p2q2 ≥ 0
17 0≥ p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2− p1−q1 1≥+p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2
18 p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2− p1−q1 ≥−1 p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2 ≥ 0
19 0≥ p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2− p1−q2 1≥+p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2
20 p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2− p1−q2 ≥−1 p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2 ≥ 0
21 0≥ p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2−q1 1≥ p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2
22 p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2−q1 ≥−1 p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2 ≥ 0
23 0≥−p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2−q2 1≥−p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2
24 −p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2−q2 ≥−1 −p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2 ≥ 0
TABLE III Construction of the correlation polytope for four events. The 24 faces of the polytope spanned by the vertices corresponding to the
rows enumerated in Table II. The bounds 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, and 23-24 are the Clauser-Horne inequalities .
the impossibility to consistently assign truth and falsity for all quantum propositions simultaneously.
A. Hilbert lattices as quantum logics
Let us first review some quantum logic first. Linear vector spaces have a long tradition in classical physics; e.g., as config-
uration and phase spaces. Hilbert spaces are linear vector spaces endowed with a scalar product, which is particularly useful
for a computation of probabilities for experimental outcomes. The Hilbert space formalism (19) proved extremely useful in the
investigation of quantum phenomena.
Quantum logic has been introduced by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann (20) in the thirties. They organized it top-
down, starting from Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics. Certain entities of Hilbert spaces are identified with propo-
sitions, partial order relations and lattice operations. These relations and operations are identified with the logical implication
relation and operations such as and, or, and the negation.
Thereby, as we shall see, “nonclassical, i.e., ”nonboolean”, logical structures are induced. Hence, if theoretical physics is
assumed to be a faithful representation of our experience, such an “operational” (21; 22; 23) logic derives its justification by
the phenomena themselves. In this sense, one of the main ideas behind quantum logic is the quasi-inductive construction of the
logical and algebraic order of events from empirical findings.
1. Definition
Heuristically, the dimensionality of the Hilbert space for a given quantum system depends on the number of possible mutually
exclusive outcomes. In the spin– 12 case, for example, there are two outcomes “up” and “down” associated with spin state
measurements along arbitrary directions. Thus, the dimensionality of Hilbert space needs to be two.
6Then the following identifications can be made. Table IV lists the identifications of relations of operations of classical Boolean
set-theoretic and quantum Hillbert lattice types.
generic lattice order relation → “meet” ⊓ “join” ⊔ “complement” ′
“classical” lattice subset ⊂ intersection ∩ union ∪ complement
of subsets
of a set
propositional implication disjunction conjunction negation
calculus → “and” ∧ “or” ∨ “not”¬
Hilbert subspace intersection of closure of orthogonal
lattice relation subspaces ∩ linear subspace
⊂ span ⊕ ⊥





TABLE IV Comparison of the identifications of lattice relations and operations for the lattices of subsets of a set, for experimental proposi-
tional calculi, for Hilbert lattices, and for lattices of commuting projection operators.
• Any closed linear subspace of — or, equivalently, any projection operator on — a Hilbert space corresponds to an elementary
proposition. The elementary true–false proposition can in English be spelled out explicitly as
“The physical system has a property corresponding to the associated closed linear subspace.”
• The logical and operation is identified with the set theoretical intersection of two propositions “∩”; i.e., with the intersection
of two subspaces. It is denoted by the symbol “∧”. So, for two propositions p and q and their associated closed linear
subspaces Mp and Mq,
Mp∧q = {x | x ∈Mp, x ∈Mq}.
• The logical or operation is identified with the closure of the linear span “⊕” of the subspaces corresponding to the two
propositions. It is denoted by the symbol “∨”. So, for two propositions p and q and their associated closed linear
subspaces Mp and Mq,
Mp∨q = Mp⊕Mq = {x | x = αx + βz, α,β ∈ C, y ∈Mp, z ∈Mq}.
The symbol ⊕ will used to indicate the closed linear subspace spanned by two vectors. That is,
u⊕ v = {w | w = αu + βv, α,β ∈ C, u,v ∈H}.
More generally, the symbol⊕ indicates the closed linear subspace spanned by two linear subspaces. That is, if u,v∈C(H),
where C(H) stands for the set of all subspaces of the Hilbert space, then
u⊕ v = {w | w = αu + βv, α,β ∈ R, u,v ∈ C(H)}.
Notice that a vector of Hilbert space may be an element of Mp⊕Mq without being an element of either Mp or Mq, since
Mp⊕Mq includes all the vectors in Mp∪Mq, as well as all of their linear combinations (superpositions) and their limit
vectors.
• The logical not-operation, or “negation” or “complement,” is identified with operation of taking the orthogonal subspace “⊥”.
It is denoted by the symbol “ ′ ”. In particular, for a proposition p and its associated closed linear subspace Mp,
Mp′ = {x | (x,y) = 0, y ∈Mp}.
• The logical implication relation is identified with the set theoretical subset relation “⊂”. It is denoted by the symbol “→”. So,
for two propositions p and q and their associated closed linear subspaces Mp and Mq,
p→ q⇐⇒Mp ⊂Mq.
7• A trivial statement which is always true is denoted by 1. It is represented by the entire Hilbert space H. So,
M1 = H.
• An absurd statement which is always false is denoted by 0. It is represented by the zero vector 0. So,
M0 = 0.
2. Diagrammatical representation, blocks, complementarity
Propositional structures are often represented by Hasse and Greechie diagrams. A Hasse diagram is a convenient representa-
tion of the logical implication, as well as of the and and or operations among propositions. Points “ • ” represent propositions.
Propositions which are implied by other ones are drawn higher than the other ones. Two propositions are connected by a line if
one implies the other. Atoms are propositions which “cover” the least element 0; i.e., they lie “just above” 0 in a Hasse diagram
of the partial order.
A much more compact representation of the propositional calculus can be given in terms of its Greechie diagram. There, the
points “ ◦ ” represent the atoms. If they belong to the same Boolean algebra, they are connected by edges or smooth curves. The
collection of all atoms belonging to the same Boolean algebra are called block; i.e., every block represents a Boolean algebra
within a nonboolean structure. The blocks can be joined or pasted together as follows.
• The tautologies of all blocks are identified.
• The absurdities of all blocks are identified.
• Identical elements in different blocks are identified.
• The logical and algebraic structures of all blocks remain intact.
This construction is often referred to as pasting construction. If the blocks are only pasted together at the tautology and the
absurdity, one calls the resulting logic a horizontal sum. We will later use “almost” Greechie diagrams, omitting points which
belong to only one curve. This makes the diagrams a bit more easy to draw and decipher.
Note that all propositions within a given block are co-measurable; propositions belonging to different blocks are not. This
latter feature is an expression of complementarity.
Every single block represents some “maximally co-measurable observables,” which could also be termed the complete context.
It makes no sense to speak of the “real physical existence” of different contexts from a strictly operational point of view, as
knowledge of a single context makes impossible the measurement of all the other ones. By Einstein-Podolski-Rosen type
arguments (24) utilizing a configuration sketched in Fig. 1 it may be possible to claim to be able to infer two different contexts
counterfactually. As problematic as counterfactual physical reasoning may appear from an operational, idealistic point of view,
even the simultaneous “counterfactual inference” of three or more blocks fails because of the missing uniqueness property (25)
of quantum states.
As a first example, we shall paste together observables of the spin one-half systems. We have associated a propositional
system
L(x) = {0,E,E ′,1},
corresponding to the outcomes of a measurement of the spin states along some arbitrary direction x. If the spin states would be
measured along a different spatial direction, say x 6= x modpi, an identical propositional system
L(x) = {0,F,F ′,1}








































































FIG. 3 a) Hasse diagram of the “Chinese lantern” form obtained by the pasting of two spin one-half state propositional systems L(x) and L(x)
which are nonco-measurable. The resulting logical structure is a modular orthocomplemented lattice L(x)⊕L(x) = MO2. The blocks (without










FIG. 4 Two–dimensional configuration demonstrating the nondistributivity of Hilbert lattice. .
whose Hasse diagram is of the “Chinese lantern” form and is drawn in Figure 3a). The corresponding Greechie Diagram is
drawn in Figure 3b). Here, the “O” stands for orthocomplemented, the term “M” stands for modular, and the subscript “2”
stands for the pasting of two Boolean subalgebras 22.
The propositional system obtained is not a classical Boolean algebra, since the distributive law is not satisfied; i.e.,
F ∨ (E ∧E ′) ?= (F ∨E)∧ (F ∨E ′)
F ∨0 ?= 1∧1
F 6= 1, (2)
F ∧ (E ∨E ′) ?= (F ∧E)∨ (F ∧E ′)
F ∧1 ?= 0∧0
F 6= 0. (3)
The two-dimensional Hilbert space representation of this configuration is depicted in Figure 4.
Notice that the expressions can be easily evaluated by using the Hasse diagram 3a). For any a,b, a∨b is just the least element
which is connected by a and b; a∧b is just the highest element connected to a and b. Intermediates which are not connected to
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a∨b is called a least upper bound of a and b. a∧b is called a greatest lower bound of a and b.
MO2 is a specific example of an algebraic structure which is called a lattice. Any two elements of a lattice have a least upper
and a greatest lower bound. Furthermore,
a→ b and a→ c, then a→ (b∧ c);
b→ a and c→ a, then (b∨ c)→ a.
Nondistributivity is the algebraic expression of nonclassicality, but what exactly is the algebraic reason for nondistributivity?
It is, heuristically speaking, scarcity, the lack of necessary algebraic elements to “fill up” all propositions necessary to obtain one
and the same result in both ways as expressed by the distributive law.
9B. Probability theory
1. Gleason’s derivation of the Born rule
According to the Born rule, the expectation value 〈A〉 of an observable A is the trace of ρA; i.e., 〈A〉= tr(ρA). In particular, if A
is a projector E corresponding to an elementary yes-no proposition “the system has property Q,” then 〈E〉= tr(ρE) corresponds
to the probability of that property Q if the system is in state ρ. The equations ρ2 = ρ and tr(ρ2) = 1 are only valid for pure states,
because ρ is not idempotent for mixed states.
It is still possible to ascribe a certain degree of classical behaviour to a quantum logic by considering its block substructure.
Due to their Boolean structure, blocks are “classical mini-universes;” It is one of the mindboggling features of quantum logic
that it can be decomposed into a pasting of blocks; Conversely, by a proper arrangement of “classical mini-universes,” quantum
Hilbert logics can be obtained. This theme is used in quantum probability theory, in particular by the Gleason and the Kochen-
Specker theorems discussed below. In this sense, Gleason’s theorem can be understood as the functional analytic generalization
of the generation of all classical probability distributions by a convex sum of the extreme cases.
One way of interpreting Gleason’s theorem (26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31) is to view it as a derivation of the Born rule from
fundamental assumptions about quantum probabilities, guided by the quasi–classical; i.e., Boolean, sub-parts of quantum theory.
With these quasi–classical provisos, Gleason proved that there is no alternative to the Born rule for Hilbert spaces of dimension
greater than two.
Before we introduce Gleason’s Theorem, we have to define a measure ε on our real or complex Hilbert space. A measure is
a mapping which assigns a nonnegative real number ε(E) to each projector E such that, if Ei are mutually orthogonal, then the
measure of σ = ∑i Ei has to satisfy the (sub-)additivity property ε(σ) = ∑i ε(Ei). Any such measure is determined by its values
on the one dimensional projections. Consider a unit vector x and the associated one dimensional projector Ex = xT ⊗ x, then the
measure ε is determined by the real-valued positive function f (x) = ε(Ex) on the unit sphere. The weight W of the function f is
defined as the measure of the identity projection; i.e., W = ε(1). Then the function satisfies ∑i f (ei) = W for each orthonormal
basis {ei}. These functions are called frame functions of weight W .
For quantum probability theory, the value of the weight W is necessarily 1. The physical meaning of a frame function f (x)
is the probability of the proposition associated with the projector Ex for a given quantum system in a state associated with
f . Gleason’s Theorem can be stated as follows: Let H be a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. Let f be a frame
function. Then there exists a unique density operator (i.e., a positive operator of trace class) ρ on H such that f (x) = tr(ρEx) =
∑i〈ei|ρEx|ei〉= ∑i, j〈ei|ρ|e j〉〈e j|Ex|ei〉= ∑i, j〈ei|ρ|e j〉〈e j|x〉〈x|ei〉= 〈ρx|x〉 is a quadratic form of x for all projectors Ex associated
with elementary yes-no propositions.
2. Kochen-Specker theorem
Quantum logics of Hilbert space dimension greater than two have not a single two-valued state interpretable as consistent,
overall truth assignment (32). This is the gist of the beautiful construction of Kochen and Specker (33). For similar theorems,
see Refs. (34; 35; 36; 37; 38).
One of the most compact and comprehensive versions of the Kochen-Specker argument in three-dimensional Hilbert space
R3 has been given by Peres (39). (For other discussions, see Refs. (2; 29; 39; 40; 41; 42; 43; 44; 45; 46).) Peres’ version uses a







As will be explicitly enumerated below, these lines can be generated (by the nor-operation between nonorthogonal propositions)




Note that as three arbitrary but mutually nonorthogonal lines generate a dense set of lines (cf. (47)), it can be expected that
any such triple of lines (not just the one explicitly mentioned) generates a finite set of lines which does not allow a two-valued
probability measure.
The way it is defined, this set of lines is invariant under interchanges (permutations) of the x1,x2 and x3 axes, and under a
reversal of the direction of each of these axes. This symmetry property allows us to assign the probability measure 1 to some of
the rays without loss of generality. Assignment of probability measure 0 to these rays would be equivalent to renaming the axes,
or reversing one of the axes.
The Greechie diagram of the Peres configuration is given in Figure 5 (2). For simplicity, 24 points which belong to exactly one
edge are omitted. The coordinates should be read as follows: ¯1→−1 and 2→√2; e.g., 1¯12 denotes Sp(1,−1,√2). Concentric
circles indicate the (non orthogonal) generators mentioned above.
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Let us prove that there is no two-valued probability measure (2; 48). Due to the symmetry of the problem, we can choose
a particular coordinate axis such that, without loss of generality, P(100) = 1. Furthermore, we may assume (case 1) that
P(21¯1) = 1. It immediately follows that P(001) = P(010) = P(102) = P(¯120) = 0. A second glance shows that P(20¯1) = 1,
P(1¯12) = P(112) = 0.
Let us now suppose (case 1a) that P(201) = 1. Then we obtain P(¯112) = P(¯1¯12) = 0. We are forced to accept P(110) =
P(1¯10) = 1 — a contradiction, since (110) and (1¯10) are orthogonal to each other and lie on one edge.
Hence we have to assume (case 1b) that P(201) = 0. This gives immediately P(¯102) = 1 and P(211) = 0. Since P(01¯1) = 0,
we obtain P(2¯1¯1) = 1 and thus P(120) = 0. This requires P(2¯10) = 1 and therefore P(12¯1) = P(121) = 0. Observe that
P(210) = 1, and thus P(¯12¯1) = P(¯121) = 0. In the following step, we notice that P(10¯1) = P(101) = 1 — a contradiction, since
(101) and (10¯1) are orthogonal to each other and lie on one edge.
Thus we are forced to assume (case 2) that P(2¯11) = 1. There is no third alternative, since P(011)= 0 due to the orthogonality
with (100). Now we can repeat the argument for case 1 in its mirrored form.
C. Quantum correlations
D. Quantum violations of classical probability bounds
Due to the different form of quantum correlations, which formally is a consequence of the different way of defining quantum
probabilities discussed below, the constraints on classical probabilities are violated by quantum probabilities. Quantitatively,
this can be investigated (49) by substituting the classical probabilities by the quantum ones; i.e.,
p1 → q1(θ) = 12 [I2 + σ(θ)]⊗ I2,
p3 → q3(θ) = I2⊗ 12 [I2 + σ(θ)] ,







, where θ is the relative measurement angle in the x–z-plane, and the two particles propagate
along the y-axis, as depicted in Fig. 1.
The quantum transformation associated with the Clauser-Horne inequality for the 2–2 case is given by
O22(α,β,γ,δ) = q13(α,γ)+ q14(α,δ)+ q23(β,γ)−q24(β,δ)−q1(α)−q3(γ)
= 12 [I2 + σ(α)]⊗ 12 [I2 + σ(γ)]+ 12 [I2 + σ(α)]⊗ 12 [I2 + σ(δ)]
+ 12 [I2 + σ(β)]⊗ 12 [I2 + σ(γ)]− 12 [I2 + σ(β)]⊗ 12 [I2 + σ(δ)]
− 12 [I2 + σ(α)]⊗ I2− I2⊗ 12 [I2 + σ(γ)] ,
(6)
where α, β, γ, δ denote the measurement angles lying in the x–z-plane: α and β for one particle, γ and δ for the other one. The
eigenvalues of the self-adjoint transformation in (6) are
λ1,2,3,4(α,β,γ,δ) = 12
(±√1± sin(α−β)sin(γ− δ)−1) (7)
yielding the maximum bound ‖O22‖= maxi=1,2,3,4 λi. Note that for the particular choice of parameters α = 0,β = 2θ,γ = θ,δ =








, as compared to the classically allowed
bound from above 0.
E. Quantum contexts as blocks
All that is operationally knowable for a given quantized system is a single block representing co-measurable observables.
Thus, single blocks or, in another terminology, maximal Boolean subalgebras of Hilbert lattices, will be identified with quantum
contexts.
A quantum context can equivalently be formalized as a single (nondegenerate) “maximal” self-adjoint operator C. It has
a spectral decomposition into some complete set of orthogonal projectors Ei which correspond to propositions in the usual
Von Neumann-Birkhoff type sense (19; 20). That is, C = ∑ni=1 eiEi with mutually different ei and some orthonormal basis
{EiH | i = 1, . . .n} of n-dimensional Hilbert space H. In n dimensions, contexts can be viewed as n-pods spanned by the n
orthogonal projectors E1,E2, · · · ,En.
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In the finite subalgebras considered, an observable belonging to two or more contexts is called link observable. Contexts can
thus be depicted by Greechie diagrams (52), consisting of points which symbolize observables (representable by the spans of
vectors in n-dimensional Hilbert space). Any n points belonging to a context; i.e., to a maximal set of co-measurable observables
(representable as some orthonormal basis of n-dimensional Hilbert space), are connected by smooth curves. Two smooth curves
may be crossing in common link observables. In three dimensions, smooth curves and the associated points stand for tripods.
Still another compact representation is in terms of Tkadlec diagrams (53), in which points represent complete tripods and smooth
curves represent single legs interconnecting them.
In two dimensional Hilbert space, interlinked contexts do not exist, since every context is fixed by the assumption of one
property. The entire context is just this property, together with its negation, which corresponds to the orthogonal ray (which
spans a one dimensional subspace) or projection associated with the ray corresponding to the property.
The simplest nontrivial configuration of interlinked contexts exists in three-dimensional Hilbert space. Consider an arrange-
ment of five observables A,B,C,D,K with two systems of operators {A,B,C} and {D,K,A}, the contexts, which are inter-
connected by A. With a context, the operators commute and the associated observables are co-measurable. For two different
contexts, operators outside the link operators do not commute. A is a link observable. This propositional structure (also known
as L12) can be represented in three-dimensional Hilbert space by two tripods with a single common leg. Fig. 6 depicts this
configuration in three-dimensional real vector space, as well as in the associated Greechie and Tkadlec diagrams. The operators
B,C,A and D,K,A can be identified with the projectors corresponding to the two bases
BB−C−A = {(1,0,0)T ,(0,1,0)T ,(0,0,1)T},
BD−K−A = {(cosϕ,sinϕ,0)T ,(−sinϕ,cosϕ,0)T ,(0,0,1)T},
(8)
(the superscript “T” indicates transposition). Their matrix representation is the dyadic product of every vector with itself.
Physically, the union of contexts {B,C,A} and {D,K,A} interlinked along A does not have any direct operational meaning;
only a single context can be measured along a single quantum at a time; the other being irretrievably lost if no reconstruction
of the original state is possible. Thus, in a direct way, testing the value of observable A against different contexts {B,C,A} and
{D,K,A} is metaphysical.
It is, however, possible to counterfactually retrieve information about the two different contexts of a single quantum indirectly
by considering a singlet state |Ψ2〉 = (1/
√
3)(|+−〉+ |−+〉− |00〉) via the “explosion view” Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type
of argument depicted in Fig. 1. Since the state is form invariant with respect to variations of the measurement angle and at
the same time satisfies the uniqueness property (25), one may retrieve the first context {B,C,A} from the first quantum and the
second context {D,K,A} from the second quantum. (This is a standard procedure in Bell type arguments with two spin one-half
quanta.)
In a similar way as retrieving information from a quantized system, the only information codable into a quantized system is
given by a single block. If the block contains n atoms corresponding to n possible measurement outcomes, then the information
content is a nit (54; 55; 56). The information needs not be “located” at a particular particle, as it can be “distributed” over a
multi–partite state.
It should be noted that these findings do not necessarily imply context depencence, as possibly envisioned by Bohr (57) or
Bell (Ref. (58), Sec. 5). In particular Bell states that the “. . . result of an observation may reasonably depend not only on the
state of the system . . . but also on the complete disposition of the apparatus.”
The fallacy of context dependence might be the presumption that a physical system, at least in principle, is capable of “car-
rying” all answers to any classically retrievable question. That is true classically, since the classical context is the entirety of
observables. But it need not be true for other types of systems. Take for example, a refrigerator. If it is automated in a way to
tell you whether or not there is enough milk in it, it will be at a complete loss at answering your question if there is enough oil
in the engine of your car. Not all agents are prepared to give answers to all perceivable questions. If you force it nevertheless
to answer your question, it might give erratic answers. The erratic outcomes might, in the context translation (59)scenario, be
due to the stochasticity originating from the interaction with a “macroscopic” measurement apparatus, and the underdefined
(with respect to preparation) configuration. Context dependence, in a sense, might be viewed as the desperate attempt to main-
tain omni-realism as the belief that “entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind” (60) in view of the
challenges posed by the Kochen-Specker theorem or violations of the classical constraints on probabilities.
Rather, we might convince ourselves to adopt a holistic approach and do not force ourselves to believe in an isolated observable
separated from its missing context. In such a view, the context seems to be the primary physical entity. Observables only make
sense when seen as a function of the context, formalized by the maximal operator. It is useless in this framework to believe in
the existence of a single isolated observable devoid of the context from which it is derived.
IV. AUTOMATA AND GENERALIZED URN LOGIC
The following quasi–classical logics take up the notion of contexts as blocks representing Boolean subalgebras and the past-

































































































FIG. 6 Three equivalent representations of the same geometric configuration: a) Two tripods with a common leg; b) Greechie (orthogonality)
diagram: points stand for individual basis vectors, and orthogonal tripods are drawn as smooth curves; c) Tkadlec diagram: points represent
complete tripods and smooth curves represent single legs interconnecting them.
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allow embeddings into Boolean algebras.
A. Partition logic
The empirical logics (i.e., the propositional calculi) associated with the generalized urn models suggested by Ron Wright
(61; 62), and automaton logics (APL) (63; 64; 65; 66; 67) are equivalent (cf. Refs. (67, p.145) and (1)) and can be subsumed by
partition logics. The logical equivalence of automaton models with generalized urn models suggests that these logics are more
general and “robust” with respect to changes of the particular model than could have been expected from the particular instances
of their first appearance.
Again the concept of context or block is very important here. Partition logics are formed by pasting together contexts or blocks
based on the partitions of a set of states. The contexts themselves are derived from the input/output analysis of experiments.
B. Generalized urn models
A generalized urn model U = 〈U,C,L,Λ〉 is characterized as follows. Consider an ensemble of balls with black background
color. Printed on these balls are some color symbols from a symbolic alphabet L. The colors are elements of a set of colors C.
A particular ball type is associated with a unique combination of mono-spectrally (no mixture of wavelength) colored symbols
printed on the black ball background. Let U be the set of ball types. We shall assume that every ball contains just one single
symbol per color. (Not all types of balls; i.e., not all color/symbol combinations, may be present in the ensemble, though.)
Let |U | be the number of different types of balls, |C| be the number of different mono-spectral colors, |L| be the number of
different output symbols.
Consider the deterministic “output” or “lookup” function Λ(u,c) = v, u ∈U , c ∈C, v ∈ L, which returns one symbol per ball
type and color. One interpretation of this lookup function Λ is as follows. Consider a set of |C| eyeglasses build from filters for
the |C| different colors. Let us assume that these mono-spectral filters are “perfect” in that they totally absorb light of all other
colors but a particular single one. In that way, every color can be associated with a particular eyeglass and vice versa.
When a spectator looks at a particular ball through such an eyeglass, the only operationally recognizable symbol will be the
one in the particular color which is transmitted through the eyeglass. All other colors are absorbed, and the symbols printed
in them will appear black and therefore cannot be differentiated from the black background. Hence the ball appears to carry a
different “message” or symbol, depending on the color at which it is viewed.
An empirical logic can be constructed as follows. Consider the set of all ball types. With respect to a particular colored
eyeglass, this set disjointly “decays” or gets partitioned into those ball types which can be separated by the particular color of
the eyeglass. Every such partition of ball types can then be identified with a Boolean algebra whose atoms are the elements of
the partition. A pasting of all of these Boolean algebras yields the empirical logic associated with the particular urn model.
C. Automaton models
A (Mealy type) automaton A = 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 is characterized by the set of states S, by the set of input symbols I, and by the
set of output symbols O. δ(s, i) = s′ and λ(s, i) = o, s,s′ ∈ S, i ∈ I and o ∈ O represent the transition and the output functions,
respectively. The restriction to Mealy automata is for convenience only.
A typical automaton experiment aims at an operational determination of an unknown initial state by the input of some symbolic
sequence and the observation of the resulting output symbols. Every such input/output experiment results in a state partition in
the following way. Consider a particular automaton. Every experiment on such an automaton which tries to solve the initial state
problem is characterized by a set of input/output symbols as a result of the possible input/output sequences for this experiment.
Every such distinct set of input/output symbols is associated with a set of initial automaton states which would reproduce that
sequence. This state set may contain one or more states, depending on the ability of the experiment to separate different initial
automaton states. A partitioning of the automaton states is obtained if one considers a single input sequence and the variety of
all possible output sequences (given a particular automaton). Stated differently: given a set of inputs, the set of automaton states
decays into disjoint subsets associated with the possible output sequences. (All elements of a subset yield the same output on
the same input.)
This partition can then be identified with a Boolean algebra, with the elements of the partition interpreted as atoms. By
pasting the Boolean algebras of the “finest” partitions together one obtains an empirical partition logic associated with the
particular automaton. (The converse construction is also possible, but not unique; see below.)
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that every experiment just deals with a single input/output combination. That is,
the finest partitions are reached already after the first symbol. This does not impose any restriction on the partition logic, since
given any particular automaton, it is always possible to construct another automaton with exactly the same partition logic as the
first one with the above property.
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More explicitly, given any partition logic, it is always possible to construct a corresponding automaton with the following
specification: associate with every element of the set of partitions a single input symbol. Then take the partition with the highest
number of elements and associate a single output symbol with any element of this partition. (There are then sufficient output
symbols available for the other partitions as well.) Different partitions require different input symbols; one input symbol per
partition. The output function can then be defined by associating a single output symbol per element of the partition (associated
with a particular input symbol). Finally, choose a transition function which completely looses the state information after only
one transition; i.e., a transition function which maps all automaton state into a single one.
D. Proof of logical equivalence
From the definitions and constructions mentioned in the previous sections it is intuitively clear that, with respect to the
empirical logics, generalized urn models and finite automata models are equivalent. Every logic associated with a generalized urn
model can be interpreted as an automaton partition logic associated with some (Mealy) automaton (actually an infinity thereof).
Conversely, any logic associated with some (Mealy) automaton can be interpreted as a logic associated with some generalized
urn model (an infinity thereof). We shall proof these claims by explicit construction. Essentially, the lookup function Λ and the
output function λ will be identified. Again, the restriction to Mealy automata is for convenience only. The considerations are
robust with respect to variations of finite input/output automata.
1. Direct construction of automaton models from generalized urn models
In order to define an APL associated with a Mealy automaton A = 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 from a generalized urn modelU = 〈U,C,L,Λ〉,
let u ∈U , c ∈C, v ∈ L, and s,s′ ∈ S, i ∈ I, o ∈O, and assume |U |= |S|, |C|= |I|, |L|= |O|. The following identifications can be
made with the help of the bijections tS,tI and tO:
tS(u) = s, tI(c) = i, tO(v) = o,
δ(s, i) = si for fixed si ∈ S and arbitrary s ∈ S, i ∈ I,








More generally, one could use equivalence classes instead of a bijection. Since the input-output behavior is equivalent and the
automaton transition function is trivially |L|-to-one, both entities yield the same propositional calculus.
2. Direct construction of generalized urn models from automaton models
Conversely, consider an arbitrary Mealy automaton A = 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 and its associated propositional calculus APL.
Just as before, associate with every single automaton state s ∈ S a ball type u, associate with every input symbol i ∈ I a unique
color c, and associate with every output symbol o∈O a unique symbol v; i.e., again |U |= |S|, |C|= |I|, |L|= |O|. The following
identifications can be made with the help of the bijections τU ,τC and τL:
τU(s) = u, τC(i) = c, τL(o) = v, Λ(u,c) = τL(λ(τ−1U (u),τ−1C (c))). (10)
A direct comparison of (9) and (10) yields
τ−1U = tS, τ
−1
C = tI , τ
−1
L = tO. (11)
3. Schemes using dispersion-free states
Another equivalence scheme uses the fact that both automaton partition logics and the logic of generalized urn models have
a separating (indeed, full) set of dispersion-free states. (In what follows, the terms “dispersion-free state” “two-valued state”
“valuation” “dispersion-free probability measure” are synonyms for measures which take on only the values zero and one. We
thereby explicitly exclude dispersion-free measures which take on other values, such as 1/2 and 0, as introduced by Wright
(61).) Stated differently, given a finite atomic logic with a separating set of states, then the enumeration of the complete set of
dispersion-free states enables the explicit construction of generalized urn models and automaton logics whose logic corresponds
to the original one.
This can be achieved by “inverting” the set of two-valued states as follows. (The method is probably best understood by
considering the examples below.) Let us start with an atomic logic with a separating set of states.
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(i) In the first step, every atom of this lattice is labeled by some natural number, starting from “1” to “n”, where n stands for
the number of lattice atoms. The set of atoms is denoted by A = {1,2, . . . ,n}.
(ii) Then, all two-valued states of this lattice are labeled consecutively by natural numbers, starting from “m1” to “mr”, where
r stands for the number of two-valued states. The set of states is denoted by M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mr}.
(iii) Now partitions are defined as follows. For every atom, a set is created whose members are the numbers or “labels” of
the two-valued states which are “true” or take on the value “1” on this atom. More precisely, the elements pi(a) of the
partition P j corresponding to some atom a ∈ A are defined by
pi(a) = {k | mk(a) = 1, k ∈M} .
The partitions are obtained by taking the unions of all pi which belong to the same subalgebra P j. That the corresponding
sets are indeed partitions follows from the properties of two-valued states: two-valued states (are “true” or) take on the
value “1” on just one atom per subalgebra and (“false” or) take on the value “0” on all other atoms of this subalgebra.
(iv) Let there be t partitions labeled by “1” through “t”. The partition logic is obtained by a pasting of all partitions P j,
1≤ j ≤ t.
(v) In the following step, a corresponding generalized urn model or automaton model is obtained from the partition logic just
constructed.
(a) A generalized urn model is obtained by the following identifications (see also (61, p. 271)).
• Take as many ball types as there are two-valued states; i.e., r types of balls.
• Take as many colors as there are subalgebras or partitions; i.e., t colors.
• Take as many symbols as there are elements in the partition(s) with the maximal number of elements; i.e.,
max1≤ j≤t |P j| ≤ n. To make the construction easier, we may just take as many symbols as there are atoms; i.e.,
n symbols. (In most cases, much less symbols will suffice). Label the symbols by vl . Finally, take r “generic”
balls with black background. Now associate with every measure a different ball type. (There are r two-valued
states, so there will be r ball types.)
• The ith ball type is painted by colored symbols as follows: Find the atoms for which the ith two-valued state
mi is 1. Then paint the symbol corresponding to every such lattice atom on the ball, thereby choosing the color
associated with the subalgebra or partition the atom belongs to. If the atom belongs to more than one subalgebra,
then paint the same symbol in as many colors as there are partitions or subalgebras the atom belongs to (one
symbol per subalgebra).
This completes the construction.
(b) A Mealy automaton is obtained by the following identifications (see also (63, pp. 154–155)).
• Take as many automaton states as there are two-valued states; i.e., r automaton states.
• Take as many input symbols as there are subalgebras or partitions; i.e., t symbols.
• Take as many output symbols as there are elements in the partition(s) with the maximal number of elements
(plus one additional auxiliary output symbol “∗”, see below); i.e., max1≤ j≤t |P j| ≤ n + 1.
• The output function is chosen to match the elements of the state partition corresponding to some input symbol.
Alternatively, let the lattice atom aq ∈ A must be an atom of the subalgebra corresponding to the input il . Then
one may choose an output function such as
λ(mk, il) =
{
aq if mk(aq) = 1
∗ if mk(aq) = 0
with 1≤ k ≤ r and 1≤ l ≤ t. Here, the additional output symbol “∗” is needed.
• The transition function is r–to–1 (e.g., by δ(s, i) = s1, s,s1 ∈ S, i ∈ I), i.e., after one input the information about
the initial state is completely lost.
This completes the construction.
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1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 3 4 5
(a) (b)





1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 5
2 ∗ 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 4 ∗
3 ∗ 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 ∗ ∗
4 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 4 ∗
5 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 ∗ ∗
TABLE VI Representation of the sign coloring scheme Λ. “∗” means no sign at all (black) for the corresponding atom.
4. Example 1: The generalized urn logic L12
In what follows we shall illustrate the above constructions with a couple of examples. First, consider the generalized urn
model
〈{u1, . . . ,u5},{red,green},{1, . . . ,5},Λ〉
with Λ listed in Table V(a).
The associated Mealy automaton can be directly constructed as follows. Take tS = tO = id, where id represents the identity
function, and take tI(red) = 0 and tI(green) = 1, respectively. Furthermore, fix a (five×two)-to-one transition function by
δ(., .) = 1. The transition and output tables are listed in Table V(b). Both empirical structures yield the same propositional logic
L12.
5. Example 2: The automaton partition logic L12
Let us start with an automaton whose transition and output tables are listed in Table V(b) and indirectly construct a logically
equivalent generalized urn model by using dispersion-free states. The first thing to do is to figure out all dispersion-free states
of L12 depicted in Fig. 8. There are five of them, which we might write in vector form; i.e., in lexicographic order:
m1 = (0,0,0,0,1), m2 = (0,1,0,1,0), m3 = (0,1,1,0,0),
m4 = (1,0,0,1,0), m5 = (1,0,1,0,0).
(12)
Now define the following generalized urn model as follows. There are two subalgebras with the atoms 1,2,5 and 3,4,5,
respectively. Since there are five two-valued measures corresponding to five ball types. They are colored according to the
coloring rules defined above. and Λ as listed in Table VI.
6. Example 3: generalized urn model of the Kochen-Specker “bug” logic
Another, less simple example, is a logic which is already mentioned by Kochen and Specker (33) (this is a subgraph of their



























a3 = {10,11,12,13,14} a4 = {2,6,7,8} a5 = {1,3,4,5,9}
a2 = {4,5,6,7,8,9} a6 = {2,6,8,11,12,14}
a1 = {1,2,3} a7 = {7,10,13}
a13 =
{1,4,5,10,11,12}
a12 = {4,6,9,12,13,14} a8 = {3,5,8,9,11,14}







FIG. 7 Greechie diagram of automaton partition logic with a nonfull set of dispersion-free measures.
lattice atoms colors
mr and
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7ball type
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 5 9 9 1 13
2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 9 9 1 4
3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 5 8 10 3 10
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 5 5 9 9 12 13
5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 5 5 8 11 11 13
6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 4 6 9 9 12 4
7 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 7 7 11 11 4
8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 6 8 11 11 4
9 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 5 5 8 10 12 10
10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 7 7 11 11 13
11 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 6 8 11 11 13
12 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 3 6 9 9 12 13
13 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 3 7 7 10 13 10
14 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 3 6 8 10 12 10
TABLE VII Dispersion-free states of the Kochen-Specker “bug” logic with 14 dispersion-free states. and the associated generalized urn model
(all blank entries “∗”have been omitted).
shape with a bug.) There are 14 dispersion-free states which are listed in Table VII(a). The associated generalized urn model is
listed in Table VII(b).
E. Probability theory
The probability theory of partition logics is characterized by a full set of state, allowing to define probabilities via the convex
sum of those states. This is essentially the same procedure as for classical probabilities. In the same way, bounds on probabilities
can be established through the computation of the faces of correlation polytopes.
Consider, as an example, a logic already discussed. Its automaton partition logic is depicted in Fig. 7. The correlation
polytope of this lattice consists of 14 vertices listed in Table VII, where the 14 rows indicate the vertices corresponding to the 14
dispersion-free states. The columns represent the partitioning of the automaton states. The solution of the hull problem yields
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the equalities
1 = P1 + P2 + P3 = P4 + P10 + P13,
1 = P1 + P2−P4 + P6 + P7 =−P2 + P4−P6 + P8−P10 + P12,
1 = P1 + P2−P4 + P6−P8 + P10 + P11,
0 = P1 + P2−P4−P5 =−P1−P2 + P4−P6 + P8 + P9.
(13)
The operational meaning of Pi = Pai is “the probability to find the automaton in state ai.” Eqs. (13) are equivalent to all
probabilistic conditions on the contexts (subalgebras) 1 = P1 + P2 + P3 = P3 + P4 + P5 = P5 + P6 + P7 = P7 + P8 + P9 = P9 +
P10 + P11 = P4 + P10 + P13.
Let us now turn to the joint probability case. Notice that formally it is possible to form a statement such as a1∧ a13 (which
would be true for measure number 1 and false otherwise), but this is not operational on a single automaton, since no experiment
can decide such a proposition on a single automaton. Nevertheless, if one considers a a “singlet state” of two automata which are
in an unknown yet identical initial state, then an expression such as a1∧a13 makes operational sense if property a1 is measured
on the first automaton and property a13 on the second automaton. Indeed, all joint probabilities ai ∧ a j ∧ . . .an make sense for
n-automaton singlets.
F. Contexts
Contexts in the generalized urn model represent everything that is knowable by looking in only a single color. For automata,
this is equivalent to considering only a single string of input symbols.
V. SUMMARY
Regarding contexts; i.e., the maximum number of co-measurable observables, three different cases have been discussed. The
first, classical case, is characterized by omniscience. Within the classical framework, everything that is in principle knowable is
also knowable simultaneously.
In the generalized urn or automaton cases, if one sticks to the rules — that is, if one does not view the object unfiltered or
“screw the automaton box open” — omniscience is impossible and a quasi–classical sort of complementarity emerges: depending
on the color (or input string) chosen, one obtains knowledge of a particular observable or context. All other contexts are hidden
to the experimenter unable to lift the bounds of one color filter or one input sequence. A system science issue is emerging here;
namely the question of how intrinsic observers perform inside of a given system (63; 69). The situation resembles quantum
mechanics even more if reversible systems are considered; where an experiment can be “undone” only by investing all the
information gained from previous experiments (without being able to copy these)(70; 71).
For the quantum case, the mere assumption of the existence — albeit inaccessible to an intrisic observer — of even a finite
number of contexts yields a complete contradiction. In view of this, one can adopt at least two interpretations: that an observable
depends on the entire context; or that more than one context simply does not exist for quantum systems. The former view has
been mentioned by Bell (and also by Bohr to some degree), and can be subsumed by the term “context dependence.” To the
author, context dependence is the last resort of a realism which is inclined to maintain “a sort of” classical omniscience, even in
view of the Kochen-Specker and Bell-type theorems.
The latter viewpoint — that quantum systems do not encode more than a single context — bears rather straightforward
consequences, but needs to cope with the fact that it is indeed possible to measure different contexts; even if there is a mismatch
between the preparation and the measurement context. It has been proposed that in these cases the measurement apparatus
“translates” one context into the other at the prize of randomizing the measurement result (59). This context translation principle
could be tested by changing the measurement apparatus’ ability of translation.
All in all, contexts seem to be an exciting subject. The notion may become more useful and relevant, as progress is made
towards a better comprehension of the quantum world and its differences with respect to other classical and quasi–classical
systems.
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